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Sentinel sites, where problems can be identified early or investigated in detail,
form an important part of planning for exotic disease outbreaks in humans,
livestock and plants. Key questions are: how many sentinels are required,
where should they be positioned and how effective are they at rapidly identi-
fying new invasions? The sentinel apiary system for invasive honeybee pests
and diseases illustrates the costs and benefits of such approaches. Here, we
address these issues with two mathematical modelling approaches. The first
approach is generic and uses probabilistic arguments to calculate the average
number of affected sites when an outbreak is first detected, providing rapid
and general insights that we have applied to a range of infectious diseases.
The second approach uses a computationally intensive, stochastic, spatial
model to simulate multiple outbreaks and to determine appropriate sentinel
locations for UK apiaries. Bothmodels quantify the anticipated increase in suc-
cess of sentinel sites as their number increases and as non-sentinel sites become
worse at detection; however, unexpectedly sentinels perform relatively better
for faster growing outbreaks. Additionally, the spatial model allows us to
quantify the substantial role that carefully positioned sentinels can play in
the rapid detection of exotic invasions.1. Introduction
The aim of surveillance in a biosecurity context is to monitor for changes to the
health of human, animal or plant populations, and is essential to provide evidence
of the absence of a disease or pest organism [1]. In addition, surveillance—either
focused or applied en masse—is a key method of detecting novel or unexpected
patterns, which may signify the invasion or emergence of new health issues [2].
Early interception is particularly important when considering the spread of an
invasive pest or disease to a new territory, because timely detection may allow
eradiation rather than establishment [3]. Sentinel surveillance concentrates
activities on selected subpopulations to enhance detection and improve cost-
effectiveness of surveillance efforts [4]. The term ‘sentinel’ invokes the concept
of standing guard or keeping watch, and can be used in many different surveil-
lance contexts. Sentinels can be deliberately placed, like the classic miner’s
canary [4], or they may be more observational, like crow deaths preceding
human outbreaks of West Nile virus [5] or even simply selected locations with
heightened levels of detection and effective reporting [6].
Here, we develop two distinct but complementary approaches to quantify
the impact of intense-surveillance sentinel locations on the early detection of
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mathematical formulae for the probability of detection given a
general exponentially growing outbreak. The second method
is tailored to honeybee pests and diseases in the UK, and
allows us to assess the spatial aspect of outbreaks and hence
the potential to choose optimal sentinel apiary locations. We
assume that each apiary contains a constant number of hives
throughout all timeandall simulations, but there is considerable
heterogeneity between apiaries as captured by National Bee
Unit (NBU) recorded inspections. In both models, non-sentinel
(normal) sites are assumed to detect an invasive species at a low
constant rate; by contrast, at sentinel locations it is assumed that
regular inspections are carried out which have a substantially
higher chance of detecting an invading organism if it is present
at the location. Therefore, in both models, the driving force is
the rapidly increasing number of sites that are affected, increas-
ing the likelihood both that one of the owners notices the
pest/disease and that a sentinel is affected.
The global trade in honeybees and their hive products has
resulted in the concomitant movement of their pests and
parasites including: small hive beetle [7,8], Asian hornet [9],
the microsporidium Nosema ceranae [10] and ectoparasitic
mitesVarroa destructor [11] andTropilaelaps spp. [12]. Each inva-
sion can affect the health of the resident honeybee population,
leading to large-scale colony deaths (e.g. Varroa [11] and
Nosema [13]). Failed early eradication can result in long-term
impacts on pollinator health and necessitate continued efforts
on containment and mitigation, both of which have significant
economic consequences [3,14]; for example, the cost of failing
to eradicate Varroa in the UK has been estimated at over
£27million annually [15]. To enable the early detection and era-
dication of exotic honeybee parasites the NBU already
supports a network of 131 sentinel apiaries across England
and Wales.
Our aims in this paper are to explore the generalities of
using sentinel locations to rapidly detect invading organisms,
considering under which circumstances sentinels are most
likely to offer a substantial benefit. These concepts are then
extended to the specific problem of honeybee pests and
pathogens, and we predict the impact of sentinel apiaries
and how their spatial arrangement could be improved.2. The tractable model
Both the mathematically tractable model and the spatial simu-
lation adopt the same assumptions about detection and the
action of sentinels, based on the probability of initially detect-
ing a novel invasion (at sentinel and non-sentinel locations).
For non-sentinel locations, we assume that there is a daily
independent probability, p, that infection is identified at each
(infected) location and reported to the authorities. Sentinel
locations are assumed to be at a proportion, s, of potential
sites and are periodically inspected, with a time T between
inspections. Throughout this work, we assume that the peri-
odic inspection of a sentinel location always correctly
identifies infection, and that infection is immediately detect-
able; both of these assumptions help to clarify the results and
reduce the number of model parameters, but have limited
qualitative impact on the efficacy of sentinels (see the electronic
supplementary material).
From these assumptions, relatively simple algebraic
manipulation generates an explicit formula for the probabilityof first detection of an epidemic on a given day assuming
exponential growth of new cases (see the electronic sup-
plementary material). In general, this probability is a
function of four variables ( p, s, T and the growth rate of
the epidemic, r) as well as time. However, examining the par-
ameter conditions when the sentinels are equally likely to
detect infection as non-sentinels, we can parsimoniously
quantify the proportion of locations that need to be sentinels
to have a substantive impact on the early detection of a novel
outbreak (figure 1a). It is clear, and intuitive, that sentinel
locations are most effective at detecting outbreaks where indi-
vidual infections are likely to remain undetected for long
periods of time ( p small), when even a low number of senti-
nel locations can be highly beneficial. Additionally, outbreaks
that grow more slowly (r small) require higher proportions of
sentinels for them to be equal to random detection.
Picking a specific epidemic growth rate (r), we can more
readily quantify the potential impact of a small proportion of
sentinel locations. In particular, we compare outbreaks that
double over different time periods (one week in figure 1b or
1 year in figure 1c). Mean time to detection at a non-sentinel
location (1/p) is again the key determinant of the expected out-
break size (at the point of detection), with the growth rate of the
outbreak (r) playing a secondary but significant role. Of more
applied interest is the impact of a small proportion of sentinels
(s, 10%). For slow growing outbreaks (figure 1c) a few senti-
nels (s, 0.5%) make a limited difference; however, for more
rapid outbreaks (figure 1b) even having just a thousandth of
the population as sentinels (s ¼ 0.1%) substantially reduces
the size of the outbreak, especiallywhen non-sentinel detection
times are long.
Such simple mathematical models therefore suggest that
sentinel locations can have a substantial practical benefit,
although arguably a concerted effort to improve education
and awareness such that non-sentinel infections are detected
faster (1/p is decreased) may be a more efficient use of
resources, despite the practical difficulties associated with
achieving such a policy.3. The spatial model
The mathematical model defined above provides considerable
generic understanding of the impact of sentinel locations,
but lacks multiple features of the real-world problem. Most
notably, many epidemics have a strong spatio-temporal com-
ponent [21], with infection often spreading as a stochastic
wave [22]. This is in direct contrast to the analytical model
above which assumed a simple exponential increase and ran-
domized infection of locations. In addition, sentinels are
generally not randomly selected from the entire population,
but are strategically chosen to maximize the chance of detect-
ing an infection early. Here, we use the detection of pathogen
invasion into the honeybee population of England and Wales
as a well-defined data-rich spatial problem that has wide-
ranging implications, although the decline in honeybees,
often as a result of invasive pests, is a worldwide problem.
We now consider the results of stochastic spatial simulations
(figure 2) parametrized to match recorded patterns of invasion
and disease (the electronic supplementarymaterial offers a full
description of the model). Our aim was to select sentinel
apiaries that minimize the average outbreak size. This is a com-
putationally demanding process, which in general would
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Figure 1. Theoretical prediction of outbreak sizes at detection. (a) The critical
proportion of sentinels required to be equal to owner detection; coloured
lines show the estimated doubling times for five diseases: blue tongue
virus (BTV) in cattle [16], West Nile virus (WNV) in wild birds [17], foot-
and-mouth disease (FMD) in sheep [18], low-pathogenicity avian influenza
(LPAI) in chickens [19], Varroa in honeybees and bovine tuberculosis (bTB)
in GB cattle herds [20]. Lines correspond to the doubling time given by epi-
demiological parameters from the literature, while thick lines correspond to
approximate detection rates by owners. (b,c) Impact of low proportions of
sentinels on the size of an outbreak at the time of detection, measured
as the number of infested apiaries. For faster growing epidemics (b) the out-
breaks are larger but sentinels have greater impact. (Throughout we assume
the time between surveillance visits for sentinels T ¼ 28 days.)
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figuration to evaluate the expected impact, to be repeated for
multiple configurations. However, given that we are only inter-
ested in the behaviour up to the point of detection, and that nospecific controls can be applied before detection, this compu-
tational burden can be greatly reduced. By storing the data from
multiple stochastic epidemics (in the absence of controls, sentinels
and owner detection) the chance of detection at any given time
point can be calculated numerically for any configuration of
sentinel apiaries or parameters for owner detection.
The simulations use the known location of apiaries in
England and Wales and capture local transmission, infection
dynamics within an apiary and long-range transmission
between apiaries owned by the same beekeeper [23]. The par-
ameters are chosen to capture the observed spatial spread of
multiple honeybee diseases, and lead to epidemics that
spread over a period of years, with an early doubling time of
around four to six months. All simulations are begun with
10 infected apiaries chosen to be in close proximity (within
10 km) to locations that are considered to represent a potential
risk of importing a novel pest or disease (figure 2a). In decreas-
ing order of risk, these locations are: package bees/nucleus
importers, queen importers, imported honey packers, hive pro-
ducts importers, fruit and vegetable wholesale markets, zoos,
plant importers, freight depots or ports, airports, quarantine
facilities (all shown as coloured dots in figure 2a), apiaries
along the south coast, and all apiaries (see the electronic sup-
plementary material for a greater description of these import
locations). The current selection of 131 sentinel apiary locations
provides a relatively uniform coverage of England and Wales,
which equalized the demands on regional bee inspectors
(figure 2b).
The risk of any apiary being infected at the end of a 3 year
simulation (figure 2c) closely mirrors the distribution of
import risks. Hence the hotspots for infection closely match
the large urban areas in the Midlands, the northeast of
England and Manchester, with London dominating. We
stress that this pattern is predominantly driven by the risk
of imports into the regions, rather than preferential spread
to these regions as the simulated epidemics progress. Given
these results, it is unsurprising that the most effective distri-
butions of sentinels also mimics this pattern, with many
more sentinels in the southeast of the country (figure 2d ).
With over 50 000 apiaries in England and Wales an exhaus-
tive search of all possible sentinel apiary configurations is
impossible and therefore we cannot state that the locations
predicted are truly optimal; however, they represent a sub-
stantial improvement over random placements—although
individual positions should be finessed by local knowledge.
Figure 3a compares the results of the theoretical model
(green dots, see figure 1) with a random placement of sentinels
in the full spatial model (black squares); despite the extreme
differences in modelling approach, both methods are in close
agreement. However, more striking is that the current place-
ment of sentinels (red triangles) has an impact that is
indistinguishable from a random placement of the same
number of sentinel apiaries. By contrast, using a carefully
chosen set of sentinel apiaries more closely linked to import
risk locations can substantially reduce both the time to detec-
tion and the expected size of the outbreak at the moment of
detection (figure 3b). In fact, careful spatial placement of 131
sentinels performs as well as random placement of around
500 sentinels, generating a huge improvement in efficiency.
This is to be expected—not only are the locations of sentinels
chosen to substantially increase the risk of detection, but also
the choice of initial seeding based on risk locations greatly
constrains the patterns of greatest infection.
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Figure 2. Inputs and results of the stochastic spatial model. (a) Locations of apiaries (black dots) in England and Wales together with potential import locations
catagorized by risk (low risk, pink; medium risk, green; high risk, red; see Methods). (b) Position of the 131 sentinel apiaries in England and Wales. (c) Predicted
average risk of infection for each apiary after 3 years of uncontrolled growth where the seed of infection is picked randomly from import risk locations. (d ) Improved
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take place regularly, with inspections scheduled on a
monthly basis—which matches brood time scales within the
hive. However, a key question concerns the optimal use of
sentinels in a resource-limited setting: is it better to repeat-
edly visit highest-risk sentinel apiaries or visit a larger
number less frequently? Assuming very slow owner detec-
tion rates (1/p ¼ 100 years, such that without sentinels it
takes 2–3 years to detect an infection), the impact of different
combinations of sentinel numbers and inspection interval is
assessed (figure 3c). For a given amount of effort (inspections
per week), an intermediate trade-off between numbers and
frequency is optimal; visiting the chosen sentinels three to
five times in a season in general gives the greatest impact.
Finally, we return to the question of whether there are any
general insights governing the optimal arrangement of senti-
nels. We tessellate the landscape by assigning each apiary to
the nearest sentinel location, and examine the properties of allapiaries local to each sentinel. We find that the expected
amount of infection local to each sentinel remains relatively con-
stant even as the spacing between sentinels changes (figure 3d).
We note that sentinels associated with relatively low levels of
infection in their local environment are generallywithin clusters
of high risk promoting detection in these areas. This suggests, as
may be expected, that the sentinels are arranged to inform
about similar levels of infection in their surrounding environ-
ment; this may provide a simpler mechanism for determining
the placement of sentinels in general.4. Discussion
Invasive pests and diseases are a major threat to the health of
human, livestock and wildlife populations. Key to the control
of such novel invasions is early detection, allowing controls to
be enacted while the pathogen is still at low numbers [24,25].
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detection [26]. As shown here, fast growing invasionswhich are
difficult to detect in the general population substantially benefit
from the presence of sentinels; additionally, an understanding
of risk factors can provide substantial benefits from a refined
spatial arrangement of sentinel locations.
There are considerable risks to UK honeybees posed by
invading pests, pathogens and parasites of bees, including:
Tropilaelaps mites, small hive beetle (which invaded Italy in
2014) and Asian hornet (which arrived in the UK in 2016).
Early detection of such invasions is a key element of control,
and our models suggest that this can be achieved in two differ-
entways.Greater vigilance on the part of the general population
(reducing the mean time to detection 1/p in the non-sentinel
population) has a dramatic impact on detection. This suggests
that education and awareness campaigns may be a key tool in
the fight against invaders. However, such national campaigns
may be costly and a full cost–benefit analysis would need to
be conducted to compare the cost-effectiveness.
We demonstrate that careful positioning of sentinels
across the landscape (reflecting the most probably introduc-
tion points [27]) can have a profound influence on early
detection, greatly improving on random or uniformly distrib-
uted inspection locations—a facet we postulate will hold for
any host species and invasive pests or pathogens. Thisrapid detection is contingent on good geographical knowl-
edge of where pests are likely to invade. We find that
sentinel apiaries should largely reflect the spatial pattern of
import risks, which clusters in the southeast of England
and around London. In particular, if we associate each
apiary with its nearest sentinel, then the optimal pattern
has approximately equal levels of infection associated with
its neighbouring apiaries—providing a generic means of
positioning with a minimum of computational effort.
These analyses raise the critical applied question of how
many sentinel apiaries theUKneeds. This is a value judgement,
balancing the cost of sentinel apiaries against the risk of a novel
outbreak remaining undetected. It is clear from figures 1 and 3
that even a limited number of sentinel apiaries can be highly
beneficial for preventing large-scale undetected outbreaks. It
is also apparent that having many thousands of sentinel api-
aries is both impractical and unlikely to generate huge
additional improvements. This suggests advantages to a care-
fully parametrized cost–benefit analysis to balance continual
costs of operating a network of sentinel apiaries against the sto-
chastic benefits of early detection and therefore more likely and
less expensive eradication of invasive pests and pathogens.
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